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JURISDICTION
t h e Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-129(1 )(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), this matter was assigned to the
Utah Court of Appeals, by Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated May 3, 2006,
and effective May 23, 2006.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Where a pretrial jurisdiction decision has been made on documentary
evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only legal questions that
are reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach., 838
P.2d 1120,1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic &
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990)).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-23.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Definitions. As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company,
association or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of
a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect
persons or businesses within the state of Utah.
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II.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting person to
jurisdiction. Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not
a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising
out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding the subsequent departure from the state; or the commission in
this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had no control;
or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives rise
to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine the paternity for the
purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
III.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-26.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Only claims arising from
enumerated acts may be asserted. Only claims arising from acts enumerated
herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction
over him is based upon this act.

iv

STATEMENT
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case is about a contractual dispute between Pohl Inc. of America
("Pohl") and T.A.B. Company, Inc. ("TAB") involving two issues: (1) did Pohl
have a contractual obligation to supply its metal panels to TAB in accordance
with the Project schedule; and (2) was Pohl entitled to additional time to complete
the panels due to TAB'S failure to provide necessary field measurements for
fabrication of the metal panels. In the prior action between TAB and Pohl, both
parties asserted claims for breach of contract against each other. However,
because TAB determined that it could no longer afford to litigate the prior dispute
between TAB and Pohl in the State of Utah - as TAB had agreed to do in the
Credit Application it signed for Pohl - and because Pohl learned that TAB could
not afford to pay a Judgment if Pohl prevailed in the lawsuit, TAB and Pohl
settled their dispute.
The current litigation is simply an attempt by Pohl to extort monies from
foreign defendants who also can not afford to litigate in Utah. As Pohl states in
its Brief, its products are used throughout the country. Pohl knew it was
supplying its materials for use on a public works project in Missouri and sent two
representatives to the Project site during the Project. Pohl can easily travel to

the State of Missouri to pursue these claims - where jurisdiction against these
defendants is proper.
Just as predicted by Occam's Razor1, the actual facts are much simpler
and less sinister than the fairy tale authored by Pohl's counsel. TAB, a small,
woman-owned, minority firm contracted with KCI Construction Company ("KCI"),
the general contractor on the Project, to supply and install the metal panel
system on the Project in accordance with the Project schedule. TAB then issued
a Purchase Order to Pohl to supply the metal panel system.
When efforts failed to get the metal panel system on site in time to meet
with Project schedule, KCI terminated TAB'S contract. TAB, in turn, terminated
Pohl's contract. Obviously and prudently, before terminating TAB'S contract, KCI
had performed an investigation into whether it was possible to obtain an
acceptable metal panel system from an alternate source in a shorter time frame
(thereby minimizing the delay to the Project) than TAB could deliver the Pohlmanufactured panels. No conspiracy, no tortious interference with contract; just
mitigation of damages.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

Defendants filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the underlying case for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction.

1

All things being equal, the simplest explanation tends to be the best one.
\/i

III.

DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT.

6y Order dated April 3, 2006, the trial court granted Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 27, 2000, KCI entered into a contract with the Curators of

the University of Missouri to construct the new Performing Arts Center at the
University of Missouri - St. Louis campus in St. Louis County, Missouri. This
contract was for a public works project governed by the laws of the State of
Missouri. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 2, R. 43-44.
2.

Defendant Ronald F. Webelhuth ("Webelhuth") was KCI's project

manager for the Performing Arts Center project (the "Project"). Webelhuth
Affidavit 1J 3, R. 43-44.
3.

All of Webelhuths' actions in connection with the Project were done

exclusively within the scope of his employment with KCI. Webelhuth Affidavit fl
4, R. 43-44.
4.

TAB entered into a subcontract with KCI to furnish and install the

roofing, flashing, sheet metal, smoke vents, access hatches, and the metal panel
system for the Project. Webelhuth Affidavit If 5, R. 44; Webelhuth Deposition at
8:16-19, R. 191.
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5.

The specifications for the Project required that Pohl's metal paneling

system - or an approved equal - be installed on the Project. Webelhuth
Deposition at 8:24-25; 9:1-2, R. 191-192.
6.

The subcontract between KCI and TAB authorized KCI to give TAB

notice of KCI's intent to terminate the subcontract on two days notice in the event
of a default in performance by TAB; and in such a case, KCI could then hire
another person or firm to complete the remaining work and TAB would be liable
for any excess completion costs. Webelhuth Deposition at 40:5-14, R. 213.
7.

TAB subcontracted the installation of the Project's metal panel

system to Industrial Sheet Metal Erectors, Inc. ("ISME"). Vickers Affidavit U 7, R.
48; B. Miller Affidavit U 4, R. 61.
8.

Bret Miller is ISME's Vice President; and he ran the Project for

ISME. B. Miller Affidavit H 5, R. 61.
9.

Bret Miller's father, Dennis Miller, is the President of ISME, but he

had no involvement in the Project. B. Miller Affidavit U 9, R. 61; D. Miller Affidavit
117, R. 75.
10.

TAB submitted a purchase order dated April 28, 2000 to Pohl for the

metal panel system for the Project. Vickers Affidavit U 9, R. 48; Exhibit "B" to the
Complaint, R. 11.
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11.

TAB requested Bret Miller of ISME to provide field dimensions and

scheduling information directly to Pohl for Pohl's use in fabricating the metal
panels for the Project. Bret Miller's communications with Pohl were by phone,
fax or letter. Pohl also had two representatives visit the Project site during
construction. B. Miller Affidavit fl 12, R. 61.
12.

KCI submitted the overall Project schedule to TAB in May 2000.

Exhibit "G" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 366-369.
13.

In a letter dated February 10, 2003 from KCI (written by Webelhuth

as Project Manager) to TAB, KCI advised TAB that, based upon information
previously provided and the actual dates of completion of other work on the
Project, all of the metal panel system should have been delivered to the Project
by no later than February 6, 2003. KCI's letter also reminded TAB that none of
the previous commitments for delivery of the Pohl panels had been met. KCI's
letter warned TAB of the severe consequences of late delivery of the metal
panels to the Project. Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 366-369.
14.

KCI's February 10, 2003 letter was immediately sent to Pohl by

ISME by cover letter dated February 10, 2003. Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction, R. 366-369.
15.

Pohl's counsel (who is Pohl's appellate counsel in this case) wrote a

letter dated February 12, 2003 to ISME. This letter acknowledged receipt of
ISME's February 10, 2003 letter, and took exception to the information conveyed.
Pohl's counsel advised that: "[i]ndeed, Pohl has no existing contract, with any
company, that requires it to provide any product or service of any kind, on any
date." The letter concludes by stating that the Pohl panels would only be
delivered on a C.O.D. basis, that Pohl was only committed to ship two parts of
the overall order for Pohl panels, and that TAB should contact Pohl's counsel "if it
desires Pohl to proceed." Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 371-373.
16.

ISME faxed a copy of Pohl's counsel's February 12, 2003 letter to

KCI's Webelhuth on February 12, 2003. Exhibit "G" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R.
371-373.
17.

When Pohl's metal panels did not arrive on the Project site the first

week of February, 2003, Webelhuth had discussions with Bret Miller about the
need to get the metal panels to the site in order to get the Project complete.
Webelhuth Deposition at 32:4-25; 33:1-7, R. 205-206.

18.

At that time, Bret Miller advised Webelhuth that there was an

alternative panel material that ISME could obtain, manufacture and install in
order to complete the Project. Webelhuth Deposition at 30:21-25; 31:1-13, R.
203-204.
19.

Webelhuth then approached the Project owner and architect about

using a different panel system on the Project. Webelhuth Deposition at 33:1-10,
R. 206.
20.

Webelhuth advised the owner and architect of the problems that

were being experienced in getting the Pohl panels, and that there was another
system that could be used to complete the Project. Webelhuth Deposition at
36:5-10, R. 209.
21.

On February 17, 2003, Webelhuth hand-delivered a letter to TAB

advising that if the Pohl-manufactured metal panels were not delivered to the
Project within two days, KCI was terminating TAB'S subcontract. Webelhuth
Deposition at 25:7-9, R. 198.
22.

TAB, in turn, faxed a letter to Pohl dated February 17, 2003 advising

Pohl that if the metal panels were not delivered to the Project by February 19,
2003, TAB would consider the Purchase Order to be null and void. Exhibit "C" to
the Complaint, R. 12; Exhibit "C" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 306-307.

23.

KCI terminated TAB's subcontract with KCI for the Project as a result

of TAB's inability to supply the required metal panel sections to the project in
accordance with the project schedule agreed to by TAB. Webelhuth Affidavit fl
10, R.44.
24.

TAB, in turn, terminated its contract with Pohl for non-performance.

Vickers Affidavit U 15, R. 49.
25.

As a result of KCI's termination of TAB's subcontract, TAB issued a

change order to ISME eliminating the installation of the metal panel system from
ISME's scope of work. Vickers Affidavit H 17, R. 49.
26.

Subsequent to KCI's termination of its subcontract with TAB, KCI

entered into a subcontract with ISME for ISME to supply the substitute metal
panels, and to otherwise complete TAB's scope of work. Webelhuth Affidavit H
11, R. 44-45.
27.

KCI has never entered into a contract with Pohl in relation to the

Project or otherwise. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 7, R. 44.
28.

Webelhuth spoke in person with two Pohl representatives when they

visited the Project, i.e., in St. Louis County, Missouri. Other than that on-site
discussion, Webelhuth's only other discussions with Pohl representatives
consisted of telephone communications initiated by Pohl. Webelhuth has not
conducted any business in Utah; has not contracted to supply goods or services

in Utah; has not caused any injury in Utah; does not own any real estate in Utah;
has not conducted any activities in Utah which would cause him to reasonably
anticipate being haled into Utah courts; has not traveled to Utah for any reason
for the past thirty years; and has never contracted to insure any person, property
or risk located in Utah. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 8,12-18, R. 44-45.
29.

Dennis Miller played no role on the Project; never visited the

Project; had no communications of any kind with TAB or KCI with respect to the
Project; had absolutely no communications of any kind with anyone who is or
was an employee or representative of Pohl related to this Project; has never
conducted any business in the State of Utah; has never contracted to supply
goods or services in the State of Utah; has never caused any injury within the
State of Utah; has never owned, used or possessed any real estate located in
the State of Utah; has never conducted any activities within the State of Utah
which would cause him to reasonably anticipate being hailed into Utah Courts;
and has never contracted to insure any person, property or risk located within the
State of Utah. D. Miller Affidavit fl 7-8, 13-18, R. 75-76.
30.

In February 2003, in view of the problems that ISME was

experiencing on the Project, Dennis Miller wrote a note to his son, Bret Miller,
advising him to collect the documentation for the Project. B. Miller Deposition at

103:4-8, R. 307-308; Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 370.
31.

ISME is a Missouri corporation with offices located in St. Charles,

Missouri; ISME had no contract with Pohl related to the Project; In 2000, ISME
purchased $12,064.00 of materials from Pohl and in 2001, ISME purchased
$36,950.00 of materials from Pohl; both of these purchases were for materials
used in work for East St. Louis High School in East St. Louis, Illinois; except for
the 2 small orders with Pohl in 2000 and 2001, ISME has never conducted any
business with any person or entity in the State of Utah; ISME has never
contracted to supply goods or services in the State of Utah; ISME has not caused
any injury within the State of Utah; ISME has never owned, used or possessed
any real estate located in the State of Utah; ISME have never conducted any
activities within the State of Utah which would cause ISME to reasonably
anticipate being hailed into Utah Courts; and ISME have never contracted to
insure any person, property or risk located within the State of Utah. B. Miller
Affidavit H 7, 31-35, R. 61-62.
32.

Bret Miller never traveled to Utah in connection with the Project; has

never conducted any business in the State of Utah; has never contracted to
supply goods or services in the State of Utah; has never caused any injury within
the State of Utah; has never owned, used or possessed any real estate located
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in the State of Utah; has never conducted any activities within the State of Utah
which would cause him to reasonably anticipate being hailed into Utah Courts;
and has never contracted to insure any person, property or risk located within the
State of Utah. B. Miller Affidavit U 13, 23-28, R. 61-63.

V\#

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To prove the claims as alleged in its Complaint, Pohl must prove the
following facts:
1.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME collectively

decided that they wanted ISME to supply the metal panel system for the Project;
2.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME worked together

to get the Project owner and architect to accept the substitute metal panel
system to be supplied by ISME;
3.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced KCI to

impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon TAB;
4.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or

forced TAB to impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon Pohl
by getting TAB to send its February 17, 2003 letter to Pohl threatening
termination of Pohl's Purchase Order if the metal panels are not delivered to the
Project by February 19, 2003; and
5.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or

forced TAB to terminate Pohl's Purchase Order because Pohl did not deliver its
metal panels by February 19, 2003.
Any other alleged communications or contacts with Pohl or the State of
Utah by Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and/or ISME were not in

wi

furtherance of the conspiracy that forms the basis for Pohl's claims - so these
other contacts are irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction evaluation. See Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-26.
Even if Pohl's allegations were true - and Defendants deny that they are for the allegedly conspiracy to make any sense, the motivation for the
Defendants would have been profit for themselves, not to harm or injure to Pohl.
Furthermore, while the financial impact of the alleged conspiracy might have
been felt in Utah, no "injury" occurred in the State of Utah. The Utah courts have
uniformly held that causing financial injury to a Utah business is not a sufficient
basis to assert specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
All of the alleged actions by the Defendants occurred in the State of
Missouri. By definition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23(2), since none of their
activities occurred "in this state," Defendants did not transact business in the
State of Utah - even if the actions "affected persons or businesses within the
State of Utah." See generally Memorandum Decision pp. 3-4.
Moreover, since Defendants took no action in the State of Utah, and the
only action that they allegedly took in furtherance of the conspiracy was inducing
TAB to send a letter to Pohl in Utah. The Defendants do not have sufficient
minimum contacts with the State of Utah to satisfy due process.

VA/ii

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT CAUSE AN INJURY WITHIN THE
MEANING OF UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE.

Pohl first argues that Defendants caused an "injury" within the State of
Utah for purposes of asserting jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3).
The sole basis for this claim is that the impact of the alleged conspiracy was felt
in Utah were Pohl is based.
While the financial impact may have been felt in the State of Utah - that
does not mean an "injury" occurred in the State of Utah. If Pohl's position was
taken to be the correct reading of Utah's Long-Arm Statute, then Utah could
assert long-arm jurisdiction in every case involving a Utah corporation asserting a
claim sounding in tort.
Pohl cites no cases interpreting Utah's long-arm statute in support of
Pohl's theory, and relies upon cases from other jurisdictions interpreting other
long-arm statutes. Apparently, Pohl's counsel did not search very hard as
"causing financial injury to a Utah business 'has been flatly rejected by the Utah
courts as a basis for exercising specific personal jurisdiction.'" Patriot Sys., Inc.
v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (D. Utah 1998), citing
Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 613 (D.
Utah 1995). See also Envirotech Pumpsystems v. Sterling Fluid Sys. AG, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16942, *19 (D. Utah 2000) ("... this court has consistently
rejected financial injury to a plaintiff resulting from conduct occurring outside of

Utah as a basis for exercising specific jurisdiction over a defendant."); Blue Chip
IR Group, LTD. v. Furth, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56510, *8 (D. Utah 2006)("Courts
have held that jurisdiction cannot be predicated solely upon financial injury
occurring to a Utah resident. For a court to exercise jurisdiction based solely on
financial injury 'would lead to the unacceptable proposition that jurisdiction could
be established anywhere a plaintiff might locate.'" Quoting Burt Drilling, Inc. v.
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1980)).
Even more to the point, the court in Harnischfeger Engineers, in effectively
rejecting that the term "injury" in Utah's long-arm statute can be expansively read
to include financial injury to a business located in Utah, observed as follows:
HEI can at best argue that while Uniflo tortiously interfered with and
defamed HEI in Tennessee, Virginia, and Illinois, Uniflo "caused" a
financial injury to HEI's business in Utah. Yet this argument has
been flatly rejected by the Utah courts as a basis for
exercising specific personal jurisdiction. See e.g., Brown[ v. United
States], 1993 WL 643364, at *7 [(D. Utah 1993)]("Jurisdiction
[cannot] be predicated solely upon financial injury occurring to a
Utah resident.") (citing Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & Motors,
Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532, 532 (Utah 1972)); [STV Intern.
Marketing v.] Cannondale, 750 F. Supp. [1070] at 1075 [(D. Utah.
1990)]("Loss of profits within a state in which a place of business is
maintained simply is an insufficient basis on which to find that the
injury occurred within that state. . . ."). Indeed, acceptance of such
an argument "would lead to the unacceptable proposition that
jurisdiction could be established anywhere a plaintiff might locate."
Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1980)
(citations omitted).
883 F. Supp. at 613.
Defendants simply did not cause an "injury" within the State of Utah under
Utah's long-arm statute.
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II.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT TRANSACT BUSINESS WITHIN THE
STATE OF UTAH.

Despite Pohl's efforts to muddle the record, the facts also do not support
any claim of personal jurisdiction based upon a claim that Defendants
"transacted business" within the State of Utah.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-23(2) provides as follows:
(2)
The words "transaction of business within this state" mean
activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in
this state which affect persons or businesses within the state of
Utah, (emphasis added).
The statute requires at least some activities must occur in the State of
Utah. Pohl has acknowledged in its brief that all of Defendant's activities were
conducted in the State of Missouri. As a result, the trial court correctly ruled that:
"...the only actions or conduct by them [Defendant's] that form the
basis for Plaintiff's claims were performed exclusively in the State of
Missouri - with persons or entities located in the State of
Missouri...the Court can find no nexus between Defendants'
contacts with Utah and Plaintiffs claims."
Memorandum Decision, p. 4.
As Defendants did not conduct any activities in the State of Utah, they
simply can not have transacted business within the State of Utah for purposes of
asserting long-arm jurisdiction over the Defendants.

3

III.

EVEN IF THE DEFENDANTS WERE FOUND TO HAVE
TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH, SINCE
POHL'S CLAIMS ARE UNRELATED TO THE ACTS
CONSTITUTING THE TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS, THERE IS
NO BASIS FOR ASSERTING LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANTS.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26 provides that only claims arising from acts
enumerated in Utah's Long-Arm Statute may be asserted against a defendant in
an action in which jurisdiction is based upon the enumerated acts. This is
consistent with the requirement imposed by Utah Courts that there must be a
"nexus" between the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts or contacts. See
e.g., Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. v. Teton Builders, 2005 UT4,106
P.3d 719, 726 (2005); ProAcess, Inc. v. Orlux Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270,
1276 (10th Cir. 2005).
Therefore, even if Defendants are found to have "transacted business" in
the State of Utah within the meaning of said terms, only claims that are based
upon the acts constituting the transaction of business may be asserted by Pohl in
this action if jurisdiction is to be proper.
All three of the claims asserted by Pohl in its Complaint depend upon proof
of the following facts:
1.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME collectively

decided that they wanted ISME to supply the metal panel system for the Project;

2.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME worked together

to get the Project owner and architect to accept the substitute metal panel
system to be supplied by ISME;
3.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced KCI to

impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon TAB;
4.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or

forced TAB to impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon Pohl
by getting TAB to send its February 17, 2003 letter to Pohl threatening
termination of Pohl's Purchase Order if the metal panels are not delivered to the
Project by February 19, 2003; and
5.

Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or

forced TAB to terminate Pohl's Purchase Order because Pohl did not deliver its
metal panels by February 19, 2003.
Therefore, even under Pohl's fabricated web of conjecture, the following
alleged connections with Utah have no bearing on the personal jurisdiction
analysis: that Defendants knew that Pohl's metal panels were required for use on
the Project; that Defendants knew that Pohl would be conducting activities in
Utah; that KCI had an obligation to supply Pohl's metal panels for the Project;
that ISME solicited a quote from Pohl; that ISME assisted TAB in contracting with
Pohl; that KCI used Pohl's quote in KCI's quote on the Project; that ISME and
Bret Miller communicated with Pohl about the production and delivery of the

metal panels; and that KCI had communications related to Pohl's production and
delivery of metal panels.
§ince Pohl's claims as alleged in the Complaint do not arise from these
actions, these actions - even if construed erroneously to be the transaction of
business under Utah's Long-Arm Statute - do not support the exercise of longarm jurisdiction over the Defendants. As a result, the trial court correctly ruled
that:
"...Defendants lack the substantial and continual contacts with Utah
required for general personal jurisdiction and ... the Court is
persuaded Defendants also lack the "minimum contacts" required to
satisfy the due process requirements of specific personal
jurisdiction."
Memorandum Decision, p. 4.

IV.

POHL MAY NOT RELY UPON THE CONSPIRACY THEORY OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BECAUSE NO ACTS IN
FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY WERE PERFORMED IN
UTAH.

Quoting from Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University,
711 F.2d 1387,1392 (7th cir. 1983), Pohl argues that Dennis Miller is subject to
personal jurisdiction under the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction: "The
'conspiracy theory' of personal jurisdiction is based on the 'time honored' notion
that the acts of [a] conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy may be attributed to
the other members of the conspiracy."
However, the Pohl stopped its review of the Textor case too soon. The
Textor Court went on to clarify:

To plead successfully facts supporting application of the conspiracy
theory of jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege both an actionable
conspiracy and a substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy
performed in the forum state.
711 F.2d. 1392-1393 (emphasis added, citation omitted). Here, Pohl has not
alleged any acts performed by any Defendant in the State of Utah, so Pohl may
not rely upon the "conspiracy theory" of jurisdiction. As a result, the trial court
correctly ruled that:
"...there is no basis for assertion of the conspiracy theory of
personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants as there was no
substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy performed in the
forum state."
Memorandum Decision, p. 4.

V.

DUE PROCESS PRECLUDES THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS.

The Utah Supreme Court in MFS Series Trust III v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61,
96 P.3d 927, 931 (2004) provides a nice summary of the principles that must
guide the Court when examining due process concerns in the personal
jurisdiction context:
Courts properly exercise personal jurisdiction only "where the
contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself
that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum state." We
exercise specific personal jurisdiction "only on claims arising out of
defendant's forum-state activity," and the contact between the
defendant and the forum state must be such that the defendant
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Finally,
"minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and
substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction
even if the defendant has purposely engaged in forum activities."
Thus, "the determination of whether Utah can justify asserting

"T

jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balance of fairness to the
parties and the interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction.
Mere corporate status can never be the basis for jurisdiction; "each
defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed
individually." Thus, contacts giving rise to jurisdiction over a
corporation cannot automatically be attributed to its officers and
directors; rather, each individual defendant must have sufficient
contacts. Due process is only satisfied based upon the "quality and
nature of the activity" for each individual defendant. (Citations
omitted).
Defendants believe that any reasonable review of the facts - even as
distorted and colored by Plaintiff - demonstrates that there is no "fair play and
substantial justice" in forcing three individuals and one small company (all of
whom are residents of the State of Missouri) to travel to the State of Utah to
litigate with a multi-national corporation regarding an alleged "conspiracy" to
interfere with a contract involving another small Missouri company and a Missouri
public works construction project.
Defendants did nothing in the State of Utah. The only activities alleged by
Pohl that support the claims asserted in its Complaint are: (1) Defendants
allegedly induced TAB to send the February 17, 2003 letter to Pohl in Utah; and
(2) Defendants allegedly induced TAB to terminate Pohl's Purchase Order.
These alleged actions would have been performed by the Defendants in
Missouri, not Utah. The fact that the impact of these alleged actions was felt in
Utah is simply not enough to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the Defendants.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the District Court should be affirmed.
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